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Abstract
We study the representative consumer’s risk attitude and efficient risk-sharing rules in
a single-period, single-good economy in which consumers have homogeneous probabilistic
beliefs but heterogeneous risk attitudes. We prove that if all consumers have convex ab-
solute risk tolerance, so must the representative consumer. We also identify a relationship
between the curvature of an individual consumer’s individual risk sharing rule and his
absolute cautiousness, the first derivative of absolute risk-tolerance. Some consequences
of these results and refinements of these results for the class of HARA utility functions
are discussed.
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1 Introduction
We consider an exchange economy under uncertainty with a single good and a single consump-
tion period, in which all consumers hold common probability assessments over the state space
and yet differing expected utility functions. Two well known properties hold for each Pareto
efficient allocation in such an economy. First, every consumer’s consumption level is uniquely
determined by the aggregate consumption level. Hence every consumer’s state-contingent
consumption levels can be specified as a function, called the risk sharing rule, of aggregate
consumption levels. Second, there exists a representative consumer, having an expected utility
function, in the sense that the support price of the single-consumer economy consisting solely
of the representative consumer is also the support price for the Pareto efficient allocation
of the original, multi-consumer economy. Hence, knowing the representative consumer’s risk
attitude is sufficient to price all assets in financial markets.
The benchmark result on this subject matter is the mutual fund theorem. Define absolute
risk tolerance as the reciprocal of the Arrow-Pratt measure of absolute risk aversion, and call
its first derivative absolute cautiousness. Then, hyperbolic absolute risk aversion, linear (or,
to be more precise, affine) absolute risk tolerance, and constant absolute cautiousness are all
equivalent properties of an expected utility function u, and mathematically boil down to the
existence of a τ ∈ IR and a γ ∈ IR such that
− u
′(x)
u′′(x)
= τ + γx
for every x. In particular, this property is met if u exhibits constant absolute or relative risk
aversion. The mutual fund theorem states that if all consumers have a constant, common
absolute cautiousness γ, then the representative consumer also has the same constant abso-
lute cautiousness γ and all individuals’ risk-sharing rules are linear (affine). In this paper, we
drop the assumption of a constant, common absolute cautiousness and analyze the implica-
tion of heterogeneous absolute cautiousness on the risk-sharing rules and the representative
consumer’s risk attitude. As can be inferred from existing results dispersed in the wide range
of literature, the mutual fund theorem would not hold without the assumption. The contri-
bution of this paper is, in short, to provide a detailed description of the way in which the
representative consumer’s absolute cautiousness is not constant and the risk-sharing rules are
not linear in this environment.
It has been well perceived in the literature that the assumptions for the mutual fund
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theorem are so stringent that the applicability of the theorem is questionable in both economics
and finance. While there have been many contributions dealing with cases in which the
assumptions are not met,1 they tend to concentrate on rather special cases with regards to
consumers’ risk attitudes, the number of consumers in the economy, wealth distributions across
consumers, and probabilistic distributions of initial endowments and asset returns. Moreover,
they often appeal to numerical, as opposed to analytical, methods, without fully clarifying
the principles behind their results.
We find this situation rather unsatisfactory. The reason is that while the assumptions that
the mutual fund theorem imposes on consumers’ risk attitudes are stringent, the theorem does
not require any additional assumption on the number of consumers, wealth distributions, or
asset returns. In this paper, we obtain qualitative results concerning the risk sharing rules and
the representative consumer’s risk attitude that do not depend on these characteristic of the
economy. We do not obtain any calibration results or closed-form solutions, but we believe
that this paper is an important theoretical contribution to the literature, because it uncovers
some important phenomena arising exclusively from the nature (in particular, heterogeneity)
of the consumers’ risk attitude. Let us also remark that should the financial markets be
complete, the equilibrium allocations are Pareto efficient, and our results are therefore true
for all equilibrium allocations.
Throughout the paper we establish our results for the static, one-period model. It can be
shown (Hara, in preparation) that all the results can be extended to the multi-period case
provided all consumers have time-homogeneous and time-separable expected utility functions
and the same time-discount rate. Hence, our results are directly comparable with dynamic
models such as those of Mehra and Prescott (1985), Dumas (1989), Campbell and Cochrane
(1999), Wang (1996), Benninga and Mayshar (2000), and Chan and Kogan (2002), where there
are multiple (possibly continuous and infinite) consumption periods and a common discount
rate is assumed.
In Section 3, we establish results on the effect of heterogeneity of consumers’ risk atti-
tudes on the absolute cautiousness of the representative consumer. The formula of Theorem
5 expresses the derivative of the absolute cautiousness of the representative consumer as the
sum of two components. The first one is a weighted sum of the derivatives of the individual
consumers’ absolute cautiousness, and the second is a positive multiple of the weighted vari-
1We refer to some of these contributions in the rest of this introduction and Section 7.
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ance of the absolute cautiousness across all individual consumers. A corollary to this theorem
(Corollary 6) is that if every consumer exhibits convex risk tolerance (non-increasing cau-
tiousness), then so does the representative consumer; and that any heterogeneity in absolute
cautiousness leads to strictly convex risk tolerance. In Propositions 11 to 13, we show that
the representative consumer’s absolute cautiousness tends to the absolute cautiousness of the
most absolutely cautious individual consumer in the economy as the aggregate consumption
level tends to its upper bound (which may be finite or infinite); and that it tends to that of
the least absolutely cautious individual consumer as the aggregate consumption level tends
to its lower bound (which may be finite or negative infinite).
Our results indicate that the risk attitude of the representative consumer may well be
qualitatively different from the risk attitude of any individual in the economy. Implications
of this fact on asset pricing will be discussed in Section 7.
The crucial result about consumers’ risk-sharing rules (Proposition 4) builds on results of
Wilson (1968). It relates the curvature of an individual consumer’s risk-sharing rule to how
the individual’s cautiousness compares to the cautiousness of the representative consumer.
More specifically, a risk-sharing rule is locally convex, concave, or linear if and only if the
individual’s cautiousness is locally greater than, smaller than, or equal to the representative
consumer’s cautiousness. The result also allows us to rank the curvature of the individual
consumers’ risk-sharing rules according to their cautiousness.
The behavior of the risk-sharing rules as the aggregate consumption level tends to the
upper or lower bounds is described by Propositions 11 and 13. The results state that as the
aggregate consumption level tends to the upper bound, the most absolutely cautious con-
sumers’ share of consumption as well as their marginal increment in consumption converge
to one; and that as the aggregate consumption level tends to the lower bound, the same is
true for the least absolutely cautious consumers. Hence the distribution of the individual con-
sumers’ consumption levels are more biased when the realization of the aggregate endowment
is very large or very small than when it is of a modest value.
Much stronger results can be obtained when all individual consumers exhibit constant
cautiousness, and the constants differ across them. We show (Theorem 18) that an individual
consumer’s risk-sharing rule can then be only of three types, depending on the individual’s
absolute cautiousness. Each least absolutely cautious consumer has an everywhere strictly
concave risk-sharing rule. Each most absolutely cautious consumer has an everywhere strictly
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convex risk-sharing rule. Any of the other consumers has a risk-sharing rule that is initially
convex up to a unique inflection point and concave thereafter. The inflection points, fur-
thermore, are ordered according to the consumers’ absolute cautiousness, so that the more
absolutely cautious the consumer the lower the inflection point of his risk-sharing rule.2 This
is illustrated in Figure 1 in Section 6. Implications to the literature on portfolio insurance are
mentioned in Section 7.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 states the model and gives a few preliminary
results on the representative consumer’s risk attitude. In Section 3 the curvature of an indi-
vidual’s risk-sharing rule is related to the difference between his absolute cautiousness and the
representative consumer’s counterpart. Section 4 gives the formula expressing the derivative
of absolute cautiousness of the representative consumer in terms of those of the individual
consumers. Section 5 investigates the limiting behavior of the representative consumer’s risk
attitude and of the risk-sharing rules when aggregate consumption tends to the upper or lower
bounds. In Section 6 refinements of the previous results are obtained for the case when all
individual consumers exhibit linear absolute risk tolerance. Much of the discussion of the
consequences and implications of our results is deferred to Section 7 which also concludes.
2 Model
There are I consumers, i ∈ {1, . . . , I} . Consumer i has a von-Neumann Morgenstern (also
known as Bernoulli) utility function ui :
(
di, di
)→ IR, where di ∈ IR ∪ {−∞}, di ∈ IR ∪ {∞},
and ui is infinitely many times differentiable and satisfies u′i(xi) > 0 and u
′′
i (xi) < 0 for every
xi ∈
(
di, di
)
.
The uncertainty of the economy is described by a probability measure space (Ω,F , P ).
The probability measure P specifies the common (objective) belief on the likelihood of the
states. Denote by E the expectation with respect to P . The aggregate endowment of the
economy and each consumer’s consumption are both random variables on the probability
measure space.
For each consumer i, we define his consumption set Zi to be
2We should also add that Kurosaki (2001) claimed that if all consumers exhibit constant relative risk aver-
sion, then the logarithmic risk-sharing rule, which assigns the mean of the logs of the consumers’ consumption
levels to each individual consumer’s consumption level, is linear with a slope proportional to his own relative
risk tolerance.
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{
ζi ∈ L1(Ω,F , P ) | di < ζi < di almost surely
}
. Define Z∗i =
{
ζi ∈ Zi | ui (ζi) ∈ L1(Ω,F , P )
}
.
Then Z∗i is the set of random variables ζi for which the expected utility E (ui (ζi)) is finite.
Note that since ui is strictly concave, Z∗i is a convex set. Moreover, for every xi ∈
(
di, di
)
,
ui (ζi) ≤ u′i (xi) (ζi − xi) + ui (xi). The right hand side of this inequality is integrable, and
hence the positive part ui (ζi)
+ of ui (ζi) is integrable for every ζi ∈ Zi. Hence, ζi ∈ Z∗i if and
only if the negative part ui (ζi)
− is integrable.
Define a binary relation %i on Zi by letting, for each ζi ∈ Zi and ηi ∈ Zi, ζi %i ηi if
and only if either of the following two conditions is met: ηi 6∈ Z∗i ; or ζi ∈ Z∗i , ηi ∈ Z∗i , and
E (ui (ζi)) ≥ E (ui (ηi)). Then %i is reflexive, transitive, and complete. Denote its strict part
by Âi and symmetric part by ∼i, then ζi Âi ηi for every ζi ∈ Z∗i and every ηi 6∈ Z∗i , and
ζi ∼i ηi for every ζi 6∈ Z∗i and every ηi 6∈ Z∗i . Thus the random variables ζi for which ui (ζi)
is not integrable are the least preferable ones. Since ui (ζi) is integrable if and only if the
negative part ui (ζi)
− is integrable, the way we have defined %i is intuitively consistent with
the expected utility calculation.
A consumption allocation (ζ1, . . . , ζI) ∈ Z1×· · ·×ZI is feasible for a aggregate endowment
ζ if
∑
ζi = ζ almost surely. A feasible consumption allocation (ζ∗1 , . . . , ζ∗I ) ∈ Z1 × · · · × ZI is
efficient (in the sense of Pareto) for an aggregate endowment ζ if there is no other feasible
consumption allocation (ζ1, . . . , ζI) ∈ Z1 × · · · × ZI for ζ such that ζi %i ζ∗i for every i, and
ζi Âi ζ∗i for some i. While we shall not give a formal proof, it is easy to check that, for
every aggregate endowment ζ, if there exists a feasible allocation (ζ1, . . . , ζI) for ζ such that
ζi ∈ Z∗i for some i and if (ζ∗1 , . . . , ζ∗I ) is an efficient allocation of ζ, then ζ∗i ∈ Z∗i for every i. In
short, if the aggregate endowment is sufficiently far away from the lower bound d so that some
consumer can attain a finite utility level, then every consumer attains a finite utility level at
every efficient allocation. This, in particular, implies that when the aggregate endowment
is sufficiently far away from the lower bound d, an allocation is efficient if and only if it is
efficient when the comparison is restricted to Z∗i .
It follows from the separating hyperplane theorem that a feasible allocation (ζ∗1 , . . . , ζ∗I ) ∈
Z∗1 × · · · ×Z∗I is efficient if and only if there exists a λ ∈ IRI++ such that it is a solution to the
maximization problem
max
(ζ1,...,ζI)∈Z∗1×···×Z∗I
∑
λiE (ui(ζi)) ,
subject to
∑
ζi = ζ almost surely.
(1)
Furthermore, the assumption of a common probabilistic belief and expected utility allows the
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efficient allocations to be represented in terms of risk-sharing rules. Write d =
∑
di and
d =
∑
di. A risk-sharing rule is an infinitely many times differentiable function f :
(
d, d
)→(
d1, d1
) × · · · × (dI , dI) that satisfies ∑ fi(x) = x for every x ∈ (d, d), where fi is the i-th
coordinate function of f . Note that if ζ is an aggregate endowment with d < ζ < d almost
surely and if fi(ζ) ∈ L1(Ω,F , P ) for every i, then (f1(ζ), . . . , fI(ζ)) is a feasible consumption
allocation for ζ.
For each λ = (λ1, . . . , λI) ∈ IRI++ and each x ∈
(
d, d
)
, consider the following maximization
problem:
max
(x1,...,xI)∈(d1,d1)×···×(dI ,dI)
∑
λiui(xi),
subject to
∑
xi = x.
(2)
By strict concavity for each x, there exists at most one solution to this problem, which we
denote by fλ(x). In general, there may not be any solution for some values of x and λ,
because the intervals
(
di, di
)
are open. In particular, it is possible that for every λ ∈ IRI++
there exist some x for which the maximization problem has no solution. In such a case, there
may not exist any efficient allocation at all. However, if the ui satisfy the Inada condition,
that is, u′i (xi) → ∞ as xi → di and u′i (xi) → 0 as xi → di, then, for every λ and x,
there exists a solution. This is proved in Appendix A. Then, for every λ, the mapping
fλ :
(
d, d
) → (d1, d1) × · · · × (dI , dI) is well defined. We shall assume this throughout the
paper. Since fλ is smooth by the implicit function theorem, it is a risk-sharing rule. It is
straightforward to show that (ζ∗1 , . . . , ζ∗I ) ∈ Z∗1 × · · · × Z∗I is a solution to the maximization
problem (1) if and only if ζ∗i = fλi(ζ) for every i. This argument establishes the following
lemma, which can be traced back to Borch (1962, p. 428) and Wilson (1968), and is nicely
explained in Kreps (1990, Section 5.4).
Lemma 1 If (ζ∗1 , . . . , ζ∗I ) ∈ Z∗1×· · ·×Z∗I is an efficient allocation of the aggregate endowment
ζ, then there exists a λ ∈ IRI++ such that ζ∗i = fλi(ζ) for every i. Conversely, for every
λ ∈ IRI++, if fλi(ζ) ∈ Z∗i for every i, then (fλ1(ζ), . . . , fλI(ζ)) is an efficient allocation of ζ.
As pointed out earlier, if the aggregate endowment ζ is sufficiently far away from the
lower bound d, then the conditions ζ∗i ∈ Z∗i and fλi(ζ) ∈ Z∗i are redundant.3 By virtue of
this lemma, we say that a risk-sharing rule f is efficient if there exists a λ ∈ IRI++ such that
f = fλ.
3Dumas (1989) also investigated necessary and sufficient conditions for the welfare maximization problem
of the type (1) to have a solution in a dynamic model.
7
Let f be an efficient risk-sharing rule. Denote the maximum attained in the problem
(2), with the same λ as corresponds to f , by u(x). We are thereby defining a function
u :
(
d, d
)→ IR, which is the value function of the problem. Since
∑
λiE (ui(fi(ζ))) = E
(∑
λiui(fi(ζ))
)
= E (u(ζ))
if fλi(ζ) ∈ Z∗i for every i, the function u can be interpreted as the von-Neumann Morgenstern
utility function of the representative consumer corresponding to the efficient risk-sharing rule
f . Note that the assumption of the common probabilistic belief is crucial for this interpretation
of u. By the implicit function theorem, u is smooth. To contrast with the representative
consumer, we sometimes refer to the I consumers as individual consumers.
The Arrow-Pratt measure of absolute risk aversion of consumer i is defined as
ai(xi) = −u
′′
i (xi)
u′i(xi)
> 0.
The reciprocal of the absolute risk aversion, 1/ai (xi), is the absolute risk tolerance and denoted
by ti (xi). The Arrow-Pratt measure of relative risk aversion of consumer i is defined, for
xi > 0, as
bi(xi) = −u
′′
i (xi)xi
u′i(xi)
> 0.
The reciprocal of the relative risk aversion, 1/bi (xi), is the relative risk tolerance and denoted
by si (xi). All of these are smooth functions.
Wilson (1968, page 129) referred to the first derivative of the absolute risk tolerance,
t′i(xi), as cautiousness, but we shall call it the absolute cautiousness, to distinguish it from the
relative cautiousness, which is s′i(xi). According to this terminology, if two consumers exhibit
constant but differing relative risk aversion, then they are equally relatively cautious but the
one with the smaller relative risk aversion is more absolutely cautious. This might sound a
bit confusing, but we follow the path paved by Wilson.
The absolute risk aversion a(x), absolute risk tolerance t(x), relative risk aversion b(x),
relative risk tolerance s(x), absolute cautiousness t′(x), and relative cautiousness s′(x) are
similarly defined for the representative consumer’s utility function u. Bear in mind that
they depend on the choice of an efficient risk-sharing rule f and hence on the choice of the
weights λ, although none of our analytical results depends on the choice of λ. In particular, if
markets are complete, then the first welfare theorem implies that every equilibrium allocation
is efficient. Hence our results are applicable to equilibrium allocations. The values of λ are
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then determined by the individual consumers’ initial endowments as well as the choice of an
equilibrium in case there is more than one, but our analytical results always hold regardless
of the specification of initial endowments or the choice of an equilibrium.
The following lemma is due to Wilson (1968, Theorems 4 and 5).
Lemma 2 (Wilson (1968)) Let f be an efficient risk-sharing rule and t be the representa-
tive consumer’s absolute risk tolerance corresponding to f , then, for every i and x ∈ (d, d),
t(x) =
1
f ′i(x)
ti(fi(x)), (3)
t(x) =
∑
ti (fi(x)) , (4)
t′(x) =
∑
f ′i(x)t
′
i (fi(x)) . (5)
Here are some implications of this lemma. First, by (3), f ′i(x) > 0, so that fi is strictly
increasing for every x. This property is called comonotonicity. Also note that
∑
f ′i(x) = 1 and
hence that f ′i(x) can be interpreted as a probability mass function over the set of individual
consumers. Equation (5) then states that the representative consumer’s absolute cautiousness
is the expected absolute cautiousness of the individual consumers with respect to the this
probability mass function. Third, both the absolute risk tolerance and absolute cautiousness
are bounded by the individual consumers’ counterpart via
max
{
max
i
ti (fi(x)) , Imin
i
ti (fi(x))
}
≤ t(x) ≤ Imax
i
ti (fi(x)) , (6)
min
i
t′i (fi(x)) ≤ t′(x) ≤ max
i
t′i (fi(x)) . (7)
An immediate corollary of inequality (7) is a sufficient condition for the monotonicity of t,
and hence of a.
Corollary 3 1. If ti is non-decreasing for every i, then so is t.
2. If ai is non-increasing for every i, then so is a.
3. If ti is non-increasing for every i, then so is t.
4. If ai is non-decreasing for every i, then so is a.
3 Curvature of the Efficient Risk-Sharing Rules
The following proposition is rich in interpretations.
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Proposition 4 For every i and x ∈ (d, d),
f ′′i (x)
f ′i(x)
=
1
t(x)
(
t′i (fi(x))− t′(x)
)
. (8)
Proof of Proposition 4 By equality (3),
ti (fi(x)) = t(x)f ′i(x) (9)
for every x ∈ (d, d). Differentiating both sides with respect to x, we obtain
t′i (fi(x)) f
′
i(x) = t
′(x)f ′i(x) + t(x)f
′′
i (x). (10)
Rearranging this, we complete the proof. ¥
The first implication of Proposition 4 is that for every x ∈ (d, d) and every i, f ′′i (x) > 0
if t′i (fi(x)) > t
′(x); f ′′i (x) = 0 if t
′
i (fi(x)) = t
′(x); and f ′′i (x) < 0 if t
′
i (fi(x)) < t
′(x).
This seems similar to Proposition II of Leland (1980) but in fact differs crucially from it in
that the absolute risk tolerance t is derived from the efficient risk-sharing rule f rather than
exogenously given.4 Its message is otherwise the same: an individual consumer’s risk-sharing
rule is (locally) convex if he is more absolutely cautious than the representative consumer;
(locally) concave if he is less so; and (infinitesimally) linear if they are equally absolutely
cautious. In the context of portfolio insurance, as in Leland (1980) and Brennan and Solanki
(1981), it implies that only those who are more absolutely cautious than the representative
consumer at every level x of aggregate consumption would purchase portfolio insurances.
The second, finer, implication of the proposition is that for every x ∈ (d, d) and all i and
j,
t′i (fi(x)) R t′j (fj(x))
if and only if
f ′′i (x)
f ′i(x)
R
f ′′j (x)
f ′j(x)
.
To appreciate this, recall that the ratios of the first and second derivatives, such as f ′′i (x)/f
′
i(x)
and f ′′j (x)/f
′
j(x), often appear in expected utility theory. They measure the curvatures of the
individual risk-sharing rules fi and fj . For example, f ′′i (x)/f
′
i(x) ≥ f ′′j (x)/f ′j(x) for every x
if and only if fi is a convex function of fj . Proposition 4 therefore implies that the degree
of convexity of fi is positively related to consumer i’s absolute cautiousness. That is, the
4See section 7 for a more detailed discussion.
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marginal consumption that consumer i receives as the aggregate endowment increases grows
at a rate higher than its counterpart for consumer j if consumer i is more absolutely cautious
than consumer j. What this means in the context of portfolio insurance is that consumer i
purchases more portfolio insurance (or options) relative to the size of the reference portfolio
he holds than consumer j does. Although both Leland (1980) and Brennan and Solanki
(1981) were concerned with the second derivatives f ′′i (x) and f
′′
j (x), rather than the ratios
f ′′i (x)/f
′
i(x) and f
′′
j (x)/f
′
j(x), we believe that the latter is a better notion of convexity, as it
allows comparisons of convexity which are unaffected by linear transformations of the risk-
sharing rules. Our result also shows that the levels of risk tolerance do not matter for the
curvatures of the risk-sharing rules, although they do matter for the slopes.5 This is an
important point, especially in the analysis of background risk, which was a topic included in
earlier version of this paper but is to be dealt with in a separate paper in preparation.6
4 Representative Consumer’s Risk Tolerance
Throughout this section, we let f be an efficient risk-sharing rule and denote by a, t, b, and
s the representative consumer’s absolute risk aversion, absolute risk tolerance, relative risk
aversion, and relative risk tolerance, corresponding to f .
We show that if every consumer exhibits convex absolute risk-tolerance (non-decreasing
absolute cautiousness), then so does the representative consumer. Moreover, even the slightest
heterogeneity in consumers’ absolute cautiousness would cause the representative consumer’s
absolute risk-tolerance to be strictly convex (that is, the representative consumer’s cautious-
ness would be strictly increasing). The following formula establishes these conclusions.
Theorem 5 For every x ∈ (d, d),
t′′(x) =
∑(
f ′i(x)
)2
t′′i (fi(x)) +
1
t(x)
∑
f ′i(x)
(
t′i (fi(x))− t′(x)
)2
. (11)
Recall that, by equality (5), the mean of the individual consumers’ absolute cautiousness
t′i(fi(x)) with respect to the probability mass function f
′
i(x) equals the representative con-
sumer’s cautiousness t′(x). The sum of the second term on the right hand side of (11) is thus
5We thank Christian Gollier for clarifying this point.
6A drawback of equality (8), pointed out by Jan Werner, is that the absolute cautiousness t′i(fi(x)) depends
in general on the consumption level fi(x) at which it is evaluated, but which may, in turn, be difficult to
identify. However, in the case of constant cautiousness, to be covered in Section 6, it is not necessary to
identify it.
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the variance of the t′i(fi(x)) with respect to the same probability mass function. It represents
the contribution of heterogeneity in absolute cautiousness to the derivative of the representa-
tive consumer’s absolute cautiousness. As we will see in the subsequent analysis, this theorem
has many implications, but its proof is surprisingly simple.
Proof of Theorem 5 Differentiate both sides of equality (5), then we obtain
t′′(x) =
∑
f ′′i (x)t
′
i (fi(x)) +
∑(
f ′i(x)
)2
t′′i (fi(x)) . (12)
By
∑
f ′′i (x) = 0 and equality (10),∑
f ′′i (x)t
′
i (fi(x))
=
∑
f ′′i (x)
(
t′i (fi(x))− t′(x)
)
=
∑
f ′i(x)
f ′′i (x)
f ′i(x)
(
t′i (fi(x))− t′(x)
)
=
1
t(x)
∑
f ′i(x)
(
t′i (fi(x))− t′(x)
)2
.
Plug this result into equality (12), then we obtain (11). ¥
A corollary of this theorem, in terms of the absolute risk tolerance, is:
Corollary 6 If ti is a convex function for every i, then so is t. If, moreover, the in-
dividual consumers’ absolute cautiousness are not completely equal at any aggregate con-
sumption level (that is, for every x ∈ (d, d), there exist two consumers i and j such that
t′i (fi(x)) 6= t′j (fj(x))), then t is strictly convex.
Formula (11) suggests that even if all consumers exhibit concave, rather than convex, risk
tolerance, the representative consumer may exhibit convex risk tolerance. We can therefore
say that the aggregation over heterogeneous consumers tends to induce the representative
consumer to exhibit convex risk tolerance.
Calvet, Grandmont, and Lemaire (1999) gave a similar result for the representative con-
sumer’s relative risk tolerance. Specifically, denote by si(xi) consumer i’s relative risk tol-
erance ti(xi)/xi and by s(x) the representative consumer’s relative risk tolerance t(x)/x .
Rewriting their equality (6.10), multiplying x/s(x) to both sides, and rearranging the terms,
we obtain the following formula.7
7We owe this proof to an anonymous referee
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Proposition 7 For every x ∈ (d, d), if fi(x) > 0 for every i, then
s′(x) =
∑ fi(x)
x
f ′i(x)s
′
i(fi(x)) +
1
s(x)x
∑ fi(x)
x
(si(fi(x))− s(x))2 . (13)
It can be derived from equality (4) that the mean of the individual consumers’ relative risk
tolerance si(fi(x)) with respect to the probability mass function fi(x)/x equals the represen-
tative consumer’s relative risk tolerance s(x). The sum in the second term on the right hand
side of (11) is thus the variance of the si(fi(x)) with respect to this probability mass function.
It represents the contribution of heterogeneity in relative risk tolerance to the representative
consumer’s relative cautiousness s′(x).
Denote the relative risk aversions by bi(xi) =
1
si(xi)
and b(x) =
1
s(x)
. A corollary to
Proposition 7, which is analogous to Corollary 6 is the following.
Corollary 8 Assume that di ≥ 0 for every i.
1. If si is a non-decreasing function for every i, then so is s. If, moreover, the individual
consumers’ relative risk tolerances are not completely equal at any aggregate consumption
level (that is, for every x ∈ (d, d), there exist two consumers i and j such that si (fi(x)) 6=
sj (fj(x))), then s is strictly increasing.
2. If bi is a non-increasing function for every i, then so is b. If, moreover, the individual
consumers’ relative risk aversions are not completely equal at any aggregate consumption
level (that is, for every x ∈ (d, d), there exist two consumers i and j such that bi (fi(x)) 6=
bj (fj(x))), then b is strictly decreasing.
The symmetry between formulas (11) and (13) is remarkable. The first derivative of the
representative consumer’s relative risk tolerance and absolute cautiousness are increased by
heterogeneity of individual consumers’ risk attitudes. Neither of the two formulas is strictly
more general than the other, as either accommodates some cases that the other cannot.
However, when all individual consumers exhibit constant relative risk aversion, (11) provides
a finer restriction on the representative consumer’s risk attitude. We shall come back to this
point in Section 6.
5 Limit Behavior
In this section, we investigate the limit behavior of the representative consumer’s absolute
cautiousness, relative risk tolerance (and hence relative risk aversion), and the risk-sharing
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rules. Roughly speaking, we show that the representative consumer’s absolute cautiousness
tends to the limit of the most absolutely cautious consumers’ counterpart as the aggregate
consumption level tends to its upper bound d (which may be infinite); and these consumers’
share of both the consumption levels, out of the aggregate consumption level, and of marginal
consumptions, converges to one. This result is particularly relevant in the analysis of a dy-
namic growing economy. We also provide an analogous result when the aggregate consumption
level tends to its lower bound d (which may be negative infinite), but the dominant consumers
are then the least absolutely cautious ones. This result is relevant in the analysis of a dynamic
contracting economy.8 We also make statements of the limit behavior of the representative
consumer’s relative risk tolerance (and hence relative risk aversion). All of these results will
be applied to the case where all consumers exhibit linear absolute risk tolerance in the next
section.
As a convention of this paper, we allow lim to be ∞ or −∞; max and min may be ∞ or
−∞ accordingly. From the outset, we impose the following assumption.
Assumption 9 For every consumer i, both lim
xi→di
t′i (xi) and lim
xi→di
t′i (xi) exist.
It is possible to generalize the following propositions by replacing lim by lim sup or lim inf, if
the limits do not exist.
5.1 Absolute Cautiousness and Risk-Sharing Rules
We first consider the following additional condition. It is intended to cover the case of in-
creasing absolute risk tolerance (and hence decreasing absolute risk aversion).
Assumption 10 For every consumer i, di > −∞, di =∞, and lim
xi→di
ti (xi) = 0.
Define I as the set of consumers i such that lim
xi→∞
t′i(xi) ≥ limxj→∞ t
′
j(xj) for every j, and
I as the set of consumers i such that lim
xi→di
t′i(xi) ≤ lim
xj→dj
t′j(xj) for every j. The following
proposition states that the share of consumers in I in the aggregate consumption level, as well
as in the marginal consumptions, converges to one as the aggregate consumption level diverges
to infinity, and that the representative consumer’s absolute cautiousness eventually equals
these consumers’ absolute cautiousness. It also states that the share of extra consumption
8Dumas (1989) gave an analysis of this kind in a dynamic economy with two consumers exhibiting constant
relative risk aversion.
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in excess of the lower bound which is consumed by consumers in I converges to one as the
aggregate consumption level converges to the lower bound. Also the representative consumer’s
absolute cautiousness eventually equals these consumers’ absolute cautiousness.
Proposition 11 Under Assumptions 9 and 10,
1. lim
x→∞
∑
i∈I
fi(x)
x
= lim
x→∞
∑
i∈I
f ′i(x) = 1.
2. lim
x→∞ t
′(x) = max
i∈{1,...,I}
lim
xi→∞
t′i(xi).
3. lim
x→d
∑
i∈I (fi(x)− di)
x− d = limx→d
∑
i∈I
f ′i(x) = 1.
4. lim
x→d
t′(x) = min
i∈{1,...,I}
lim
xi→di
t′i (xi).
The proof of this proposition is given in Appendix B.
We next consider the following additional condition. It is intended to cover the case
of decreasing absolute risk tolerance (and hence increasing absolute risk aversion), such as
quadratic utility functions.
Assumption 12 For every consumer i, di = −∞, di <∞, and lim
xi→di
ti (xi) = 0.
Define H as the set of consumers i such that lim
xi→di
t′i(xi) ≥ lim
xj→di
t′j(xj) for every j, and H
as the set of consumers i such that lim
xi→−∞
t′i(xi) ≤ limxj→−∞ t
′
j(xj) for every j.
Proposition 13 Under Assumptions 9 and 12,
1. lim
x→d
∑
i∈H
(
di − fi(x)
)
d− x =
∑
i∈H
f ′i(x) = 1.
2. lim
x→d
t′(x) = max
i∈{1,...,I}
lim
xi→di
t′i (xi).
3. lim
x→−∞
∑
i∈H
fi(x)
x
= lim
x→−∞
∑
i∈H
f ′i(x) = 1.
4. lim
x→−∞ t
′(x) = min
i∈{1,...,I}
lim
xi→−∞
t′i (xi).
The proof of this proposition is analogous to that of Proposition 11. We thus omit it.
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5.2 Relative Risk Tolerance and Relative Risk Aversion
The key observation for the analysis of the limit behavior of the representative consumer’s rel-
ative risk tolerance and relative risk aversion is that under suitable assumptions, lim
xi→∞
si(xi) =
lim
xi→∞
ti(xi)/xi = lim
xi→∞
t′i(xi) and lim
xi→0
si(xi) = lim
xi→0
ti(xi)/xi = lim
xi→0
t′i(xi) by L’Hoˆpital’s rule.
This allows us to apply Proposition 11 to the relative risk aversion. The additional assumption
we need for this argument is the following.
Assumption 14 For every consumer i, di = 0, and ti is a convex function.
This assumption can be satisfied by utility functions exhibiting constant relative risk aversion.
Along with other assumptions, it implies that t′i is a strictly positive, non-decreasing function.
Thus ti(xi)→∞ as xi →∞ and lim
xi→∞
si(xi) = lim
xi→∞
t′i(xi) and lim
xi→0
si(xi) = lim
xi→0
t′i(xi).
The following proposition generalizes Proposition 3 of Benninga and Mayshar (2000).
Proposition 15 Under Assumptions 9, 10, and 14,
1. lim
x→∞ s(x) = maxi∈{1,...,I}
lim
xi→∞
si(xi) and lim
x→0
s(x) = min
i∈{1,...,I}
lim
xi→0
si(xi).
2. lim
x→∞ b(x) = mini∈{1,...,I}
lim
xi→∞
bi(xi) and lim
x→0
b(x) = max
i∈{1,...,I}
lim
xi→0
bi(xi).
Proof of Proposition 15 1. By Proposition 11, lim
x→∞ t
′(x) exists and, by L’Hoˆpital’s rule,
equals lim
x→∞ s(x). By the same proposition, limx→∞ t
′(x) equals lim
xi→∞
t′i(xi) for every i ∈ I, which
equals max
i
lim
xi→∞
si(xi). Hence lim
x→∞ s(x) = maxi∈{1,...,I}
lim
xi→∞
si(xi).
As for the limit as x → 0, note that as x → 0, fi(x) → 0 and hence ti(fi(x)) → 0. Thus
t(x) =
∑
ti(fi(x)) → 0. This shows that L’Hoˆpital’s rule is applicable and the rest of the
argument is as before.
2. This follows from part 1 and the definition of b and s. ¥
Now define J as the set of consumers i such that lim
xi→∞
si(xi) ≥ lim
xj→∞
sj(xj) for every
j, which is equivalent to lim
xi→∞
bi(xi) ≤ lim
xj→∞
bj(xj) for every j. Analogously, define J as
the set of consumers i such that lim
xi→0
si(xi) ≤ lim
xj→0
sj(xj) for every j, which is equivalent to
lim
xi→0
bi(xi) ≥ lim
xj→0
bj(xj) for every j. We have already seen that J = I and J = I under
Assumption 14. Proposition 11 thus implies the following:
Proposition 16 Under Assumptions 9, 10, and 14,
1. lim
x→∞
∑
i∈J
fi(x)
x
= lim
x→∞
∑
i∈J
f ′i(x) = 1.
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2. lim
x→0
∑
i∈J
fi(x)
x
= lim
x→0
∑
i∈J
f ′i(x) = 1.
6 Linear Absolute Risk Tolerance
Combining the preceding results and assuming that all consumers’ utility functions exhibit
linear absolute risk tolerance, we show in this section that an individual consumer’s risk-
sharing rule is either everywhere concave, everywhere convex, or has a unique inflection point
below which it is convex and above which it is concave.
Mathematically, a utility function ui :
(
di, di
)→ IR exhibits linear absolute risk tolerance
if, for the corresponding absolute risk tolerance ti, there exist two numbers τi and γi such that
ti (xi) = τi + γixi. (14)
for every xi ∈
(
di, di
)
. This is equivalent to hyperbolic absolute risk aversion ai (xi) =
1
τi + γixi
and constant absolute cautiousness t′i(xi) = γi.
Note that the right hand side of equality (14) is of course positive for every xi ∈
(
di, di
)
but τi and γi may be positive, zero, or negative. However, if γi = 0, then τi > 0 and we take
di = −∞ and di = ∞. On the other hand, if γi > 0 then we take di = −τi/γi and di = ∞
and hence ti(xi) = γi (xi − di) and ti(xi) → 0 as xi → di. If γi < 0, then di = −∞ and
di = −τi/γi and hence ti(xi) = −γi
(
di − xi
)
and ti(xi)→ 0 as xi → di. Indeed, although we
do not provide the proof here, these choices of di and di are the only ones that allows ui to
satisfy the Inada condition.
As in the previous sections, let f :
(
d, d
) → (d1, d1) × · · · × (dI , dI) be an efficient risk-
sharing rule, and denote the representative consumer’s absolute risk aversion, absolute risk
tolerance, and relative risk aversion by a, t, and b, all corresponding to f .
The celebrated mutual fund theorem is documented in, for example, Wilson (1968), Huang
and Litzenberger (1988, Sections 5.15 and 5.26), Magill and Quinzii (1996, Proposition 16.3),
Gollier (2001a, Section 21.3.3), and LeRoy and Werner (2001, Section 15.6)). We do not
reproduce the statement of the theorem here. We just point out that if all consumers have
the same absolute cautiousness, that is, γ1 = · · · = γI , then the risk-sharing rule is affine and
the representative consumer has the same absolute cautiousness as the individual consumers.
Denote γ = max {γ1, . . . , γI} and γ = min {γ1, . . . , γI}. Then, according to the notation
in the previous section, I = {i | γi = γ} and I =
{
i | γi = γ
}
. Then I is the set of the most
absolutely cautious consumers and I is the set of the least absolutely cautious consumers. All
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consumers are equally cautious if and only if γ = γ. Of course, this case has been dealt with
by the mutual fund theorem, and we thus assume in the remainder of this section that γ > γ.
The first result of this section is concerned with the representative consumer’s absolute
risk tolerance.
Proposition 17 Assume that γ > γ. Then t′′(x) > 0 for every x ∈ (d, d), lim
x→d
t′(x) = γ, and
lim
x→d
t′(x) = γ.
Proof of Proposition 17 The first part of this proposition follows from Theorem 6. The
second and third parts follow from Corollary 11 or 13.
The main result of this section is the following classification of risk-sharing rules.
Theorem 18 Assume that γ > γ.
1. f ′′i (x) > 0 for every i ∈ I and x ∈
(
d, d
)
.
2. f ′′i (x) < 0 for every i ∈ I and x ∈
(
d, d
)
.
3. For every i /∈ I ∪ I, there exists a unique yi ∈
(
di, di
)
such that f ′′i (x) > 0 for every
x < yi and f ′′i (x) < 0 for every x > yi.
4. For the yi defined as in part 3, yi < yj if γi < γj; yi = yj if γi = γj; and yi > yj if
γi > γj.
Proof of Theorem 18 By Proposition 17, γ < t′(x) < γ for every x ∈ (d, d). Parts 1
and 2 then follow from Proposition 4. As for part 3, note that Proposition 17 implies that
t′ :
(
d, d
) → (γ, γ) is strictly increasing and onto. Hence, for every i /∈ I ∪ I, there exists
a unique yi ∈
(
di, di
)
such that γi = t′(yi). Since γi = t′i (fi(x)) for every x, Proposition 4
implies that yi has the property of part 3. Part 4 also follows from this property of yi and
the fact that t′ is strictly increasing. ¥
The next proposition is concerned with the total proportion of consumption levels con-
sumed by those consumers with the largest or smallest absolute cautiousness. It immediately
follows from Propositions 11 and 13. We thus omit the proof.
Proposition 19
1. If γ > 0, then lim
x→∞
∑
i∈I
fi(x)
x
= 1 and lim
x→d
∑
i∈I
fi(x)− di
x− d = 1.
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2. If γ < 0, then lim
x→−∞
∑
i∈I
fi(x)
x
= 1 and lim
x→d
∑
i∈I
di − fi(x)
d− x = 1.
If we further assume that di = 0, τi = 0, and γi > 0 for every i, then bi (xi) = 1/γi and
hence ui exhibits constant relative risk aversion 1/γi. The following result, which follows from
Proposition 17, is concerned with this case.
Proposition 20 Assume that di = 0, τi = 0, and γi > 0 for every i, and that γ > γ.
1. lim
x→∞ s(x) = γ and limx→0
s(x) = γ.
2. lim
x→∞ b(x) = 1/γ and limx→0
b(x) = 1/γ.
Let us now come back to the point we made at the end of Section 4, that when the
individual consumers exhibit constant relative risk aversion, formula (11) provides a finer
restriction on the representative consumer’s risk attitude than (13) does. To see this, note first
that an immediate implication of the latter formula is that his relative risk aversion b is strictly
decreasing. On the other hand, an immediate implication of formula (11) is that his absolute
risk tolerance t is strictly convex. Since lim
x→0
t(x) = 0 by equality (4) or (6), this strict convexity
implies that the elasticity of t is strictly greater than one, which is equivalent to saying that
b is strictly decreasing. Note however that the strict convexity of t is a strictly stronger
property than its elasticity being greater than one. This argument therefore tells us that
although the heterogeneous constant relative risk aversion of the individual consumers leads
to strictly decreasing relative risk aversion for the representative consumer, not all strictly
decreasing relative risk aversion functions can be generated for the representative consumer
by such individual consumers. An additional necessary condition is that his absolute risk
tolerance be strictly convex.
Theorem 18 is illustrated in Figure 1, which shows the risk-sharing rules in a four-consumer
economy. Their first and second derivatives are also given. Consumers differ with respect to
their constant relative risk aversion. The risk-sharing rules of the most and least risk averse
consumers are concave and convex, respectively. Intermediate consumers have sharing rules
which turn from convex for lower aggregate consumption levels to concave for higher ones. The
inflection point of the individual risk sharing rule is higher for the less risk-averse intermediate
consumer. This is better seen in the graphs of the two derivatives of the risk-sharing rules.
Re-scaling the individual utility functions or choosing a different set of weights λi, here set
to one, would change the quantitative results but nothing of the qualitative results, except
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that the individual risk-sharing rules do not in general all intersect at exactly the same point.
The figures are numerically calculated and then plotted using the constrained optimization
package in GAUSS. The values of the relative risk aversion and weights are chosen to enhance
graphical effects, not to fit to empirical findings.
7 Discussion
We have presented detailed properties of the efficient risk-sharing rules and the representative
consumer’s risk attitude in an economy under uncertainty where individual consumers have
homogeneous probabilistic beliefs over the state space but heterogeneous risk attitudes. In
particular, we showed that heterogeneity in the consumers’ absolute cautiousness, which is
the derivative of the reciprocal of the Arrow-Pratt measure of absolute risk aversion, is a key
factor for the curvature of the risk-sharing rules. We also showed that the heterogeneity in the
individual consumers’ risk attitudes has a convexifying effect on the representative consumer’s
absolute risk tolerance. We now turn to a discussion of the consequences of our results.
7.1 Convex Absolute Risk Tolerance
Based on recent data on Italian households, Guiso and Paiella (2000) found that individual
consumers exhibit concave risk tolerance and that there is some heterogeneity in their risk
attitudes. Hence, by Theorem 5, the representative consumer may well exhibit convex absolute
risk tolerance. Now suppose that this is indeed the case, and yet we erroneously assumed
that the economy were to consist of individual consumers having the same risk attitude as
the representative consumer. We would then conclude that individual consumers exhibit
convex absolute risk tolerance, which has a few testable implications. One is that, according
to Gollier and Zeckhauser (2002), younger individual consumers invest more in risky assets
than wealth-equivalent older counterparts, but this contradicts the empirical findings of, for
example, Guiso, Jappelli, and Terlizzese (1996). While this contradiction would constitute
a puzzle under the erroneous assumption, it does not do so if the heterogeneity in absolute
cautiousness and their convexifying effect are taken into consideration, as exemplified by
formula (11).
Another implication of convex absolute risk tolerance for the representative consumer is
given by Gollier (2001b), who showed that if all consumers have the same utility function,
then wealth inequality (which would correspond to the biases in the utility weights λi in our
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maximization problem (2)) increases the equilibrium price of the aggregate endowment ζ if
and only if the absolute risk tolerance (of every consumer in this case) is convex. The effect
of wealth inequality in a model of consumers with heterogeneous risk attitudes is, however,
yet to be explored.
7.2 Risk-Sharing Rules
Parts 1 and 2 of Theorem 18, which dealt with the risk sharing rules for the most and least
cautious consumer, have been obtained by Leland (1980) and Brennan and Solanki (1981),
who considered the expected utility maximization problem of a consumer who chooses over
state-contingent claims of a reference portfolio. Holding the underlying asset and a put option
is equivalent to holding cash and a call option of the same exercise price, but these are also
equivalent to having a portfolio insurance as well. In all of these cases, the generated return
is a convex function of the values of the portfolio. They were thus led to identify conditions
on the consumer’s utility function for his optimal choice of return to be a convex function of
the value of the portfolio.
The most important differences between this work and theirs is that they took the represen-
tative consumer’s risk aversion as given, while we derive it as a result of efficient risk-sharing
among heterogeneous consumers. In fact, our result shows that the case Leland (1980) an-
alyzed on page 589, where the individual and the representative consumers exhibit constant
but differing relative risk aversion, is in fact impossible, if all the other consumers also exhibit
constant relative risk aversion.
Also, the importance of part 3 of Theorem 18, i.e. the fact that risk-sharing rules for inter-
mediate linearly risk tolerant consumers are initially convex and eventually concave, cannot
be overemphasized. It is exactly the point that is not present in the analysis of Leland (1980)
and Brennan and Solanki (1981). When individual consumers have differing degrees of abso-
lute cautiousness, the representative consumer’s absolute cautiousness is strictly increasing,
ranging from the smallest to the largest. If an individual consumer has neither the smallest
nor the largest absolute cautiousness, then his absolute cautiousness must be caught up with
by the representative consumer’s counterpart at some aggregate consumption level. Below
this level, his risk-sharing rule is convex, and, above this level, it is concave. An important
implication of this result in the context of portfolio insurance is that only consumers with the
smallest relative risk aversion (the largest absolute cautiousness) would buy portfolio insur-
21
ance, as the others’ risk-sharing rules would eventually become concave. This significantly
undermines the applicability of the results of Leland (1980) and Brennan and Solanki (1981).
They are valid in a two-consumer economy, but do not generalize to an economy with a large
number of consumers with diverse levels of relative risk aversion. This confirms a conjecture
by Dumas (1989), who concentrated on a two-consumer economy but concluded by suggesting
that the equilibrium behavior of a three-consumer economy may be critically different from
that in his two-consumer economy.
Part 3 of Theorem 18 can be partially extended to the general case. Call an intermediate
consumer a consumer whose absolute cautiousness is neither the largest nor the smallest when
aggregate endowment tends to either of its limits. Then this intermediate consumer’s risk-
sharing rule must be initially convex and eventually concave. Given smoothness of all utility
functions, this consumer’s risk-sharing rule must have at least one inflection point.
7.3 Asset Pricing
As is well known, any positive multiple of the representative consumer’s marginal utility is
a state price deflator (also known as the state price density and as the pricing kernel). This
state-price deflator can be expressed as a function of the representative consumer’s absolute
risk tolerance. We now explore how assets may be mis-priced if a modeler ignores the issue
of aggregation and erroneously assumes that the representative agent behaves just as an
individual consumer in the economy.
To illustrate our first example of mis-pricing, assume that each consumer exhibits linear
absolute risk tolerance, but its first derivative, the absolute cautiousness, differs across them.
We then know from Corollary 6 that the representative consumer’s absolute risk tolerance is a
strictly convex function of aggregate consumptions. Yet, suppose that a modeler erroneously
assumed that the representative consumer would also exhibit linear absolute risk tolerance.
It can then be shown that even if the absolute risk tolerance and cautiousness are chosen
to match the true values at some aggregate consumption level,9 the price of any asset with
an increasing payoff function (of aggregate endowment) would be under-estimated. Since the
aggregate endowment is an increasing function of itself, this implies that the equity premium
9This is equivalent to saying that the absolute risk tolerance of the hypothetical representative consumer
is a linear approximation of that of the true representative consumer at some aggregate consumption level.
Since the absolute risk tolerance of the hypothetical representative consumer need not be equal to zero at zero
consumption, the resulting relative risk aversion need not be constant.
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is under-estimated. Hence a modeler would find it more difficult to match the observed equity
premium with reasonable risk preferences if she ignores the convexifying effect of aggregation
on the representative consumer’s absolute risk tolerance.
For our second example of mis-pricing, assume that each consumer exhibits constant rel-
ative risk aversion, but the constants differ across consumers. We then know from Corollary
8 that the representative consumer’s relative risk aversion is a strictly decreasing function
of aggregate consumption. Yet, suppose that a modeler erroneously assumed that the rep-
resentative consumer would also exhibit constant relative risk aversion. Franke, Stapleton,
and Subrahmanyam (1999) showed that even if the relative risk aversion is chosen such that
the theoretical equity premium is matched to the true equity premium (of the aggregate en-
dowment), the price of any asset with a convex payoff function (of aggregate endowment),
such as call and put options, is under-estimated. The consistency with empirical findings
should be noted: Aı¨t-Sahalia and Lo (2000) derived the representative consumer’s relative
risk aversion from option prices in a non-parametric, non-linear way. They find that it is
decreasing (almost) everywhere. This is exactly what we would expect and is not necessarily
in contradiction to individual consumers having constant relative risk aversion.
A Existence of a Solution to the Maximization Problem (2)
In this appendix, we prove that for every λ and x, there exists a solution to the maximization
problem (2), that is, fλ :
(
d, d
)→ (d1, d1)× · · · × (dI , dI) is well defined.
Indeed, for each i, the function λiu′i :
(
di, di
) → IR++ is strictly decreasing and onto.
Hence it has an inverse, which we denote by ϕi : IR++ →
(
di, di
)
. Then ϕi is also strictly
decreasing and onto. Define ϕ : IR++ →
(
d, d
)
by ϕ =
∑
ϕi. Then ϕ is also strictly decreasing
and onto. Then the composite mapping ϕ ◦ (λiu′i) :
(
di, di
) → (d, d) is well defined. It is
easy to check that the inverse of this mapping equals fλi. Note that we have also shown that
f ′λi (x) > 0 for every x and fλi (x)→ d as x→ d and fλi (x)→ d as x→ d.
B Proof of Proposition 11
To prove Proposition 11, we need two lemmas. The first one is concerned with the ratio of
two individual consumers’ risk-sharing rules and their derivatives.
23
Lemma 21 Under Assumptions 9 and 10, if lim
xi→∞
t′i(xi) < limxj→∞
t′j(xj), then limx→∞
fi(x)
fj(x)
=
lim
x→∞
f ′i(x)
f ′j(x)
= 0.
Proof of Lemma 21 Let two real numbers δi and δj be such that
lim
xi→∞
t′i (xi) < δi < δj < limxj→∞
t′j (xj) .
Since di =∞ and ti(xi) > 0 for every xi, lim
xi→∞
t′i (xi) ≥ 0. Hence δi > 0 and δj > 0. Then let
x > d be such that t′i (xi) < δi < δj < t
′
j (xj) for every xi ≥ fi (x) and xj ≥ fj (x). Then, for
such xi and xj ,
ti(xi) <δi (xi − fi (x)) + ti (fi(x)) ,
tj(xj) >δj (xj − fj (x)) + tj (fj(x)) .
By equality (3) and the fact that a consumer’s absolute risk aversion ai(·) is the reciprocal of
his absolute risk tolerance ti(·),∫ x
x
ai (fi(z)) f ′i(z) dz =
∫ x
x
aj (fj(z)) f ′j(z) dz
for every x ≥ x. By integration by parts, this is equivalent to∫ fi(x)
fi(x)
ai (z) dz =
∫ fj(x)
fj(x)
aj (z) dz. (15)
Thus ∫ fi(x)
fi(x)
dz
δi (z − fi (x)) + ti (fi (x)) <
∫ fj(x)
fj(x)
dz
δj (z − fj (x)) + tj (fj (x)) .
Take the integral and then the exponential of both sides, then we obtain(
δi (fi(x)− fi (x)) + ti (fi (x))
ti (fi (x))
)1/δi
<
(
δj (fj(x)− fj (x)) + tj (fj (x))
tj (fj (x))
)1/δj
,
because 0 < δi < δj . Thus
fi(x)− fi (x) + ti (fi (x))
δi
< k
(
fj(x)− fj (x) + tj (fj (x))
δj
)δi/δj
,
where
k =
ti (fi (x))
δi
(
δj
tj (fj (x))
)δi/δj
> 0.
Since 0 < δi/δj < 1,
fi(x)− fi (x) + ti (fi (x))
δi
fj(x)− fj (x) + tj (fj (x))
δj
→ 0 (16)
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as x→∞. Hence fi(x)/fj(x)→ 0 as x→∞.
By equality (2),
f ′i(x)
f ′j(x)
=
ti (fi(x))
tj (fj(x))
<
δi
δj
fi(x)− fi (x) + ti (fi (x))
δi
fj(x)− fj (x) + tj (fj (x))
δj
.
By (16), the far right hand side converges to 0. Hence f ′i(x)/f
′
j(x)→ 0. ¥
The next lemma is concerned with the limit behavior of the risk-sharing rules when the
aggregate consumption levels converge to the lower bound.
Lemma 22 Under Assumptions 9 and 10, if lim
xj→dj
t′i(xj) < lim
xi→di
t′i(xi), then limx→∞
fi(x)
fj(x)
=
lim
x→∞
f ′i(x)
f ′j(x)
= 0.
Proof of Lemma 22 Let two real numbers δi and δj be such that
lim
xj→dj
t′j (xj) < δj < δi < lim
xi→di
t′i (xi) .
Since tj (xj) ≥ 0 for every xj and tj (xj) → 0 as xj → dj , we have lim sup
xj→dj
t′j (xj) ≥ 0. Hence
δj > 0 and δi > 0. Then let x > d be such that t′j (xj) < δj < δi < t
′
i (xi) for every xi ≤ fi (x)
and xj ≤ fj (x). Thus, for such xi and xj , ti (xi) > δi (xi − di) and tj (xj) < δj
(
xj − dj
)
.
Since, for every x ∈ (d, x), ∫ fj(x)
fj(x)
dz
tj (z)
=
∫ fi(x)
fi(x)
dz
ti (z)
,
we have ∫ fj(x)
fj(x)
dz
δj
(
z − dj
) < ∫ fi(x)
fi(x)
dz
δi (z − di)
(17)
Thus (
fj (x)− dj
fj (x)− dj
)1/δj
<
(
fi (x)− di
fi (x)− di
)1/δi
.
Hence there exists a positive number k such that
fi (x)− di < k
(
fj (x)− dj
)δi/δj . (18)
Recall that both fi :
(
d, d
) → (di, di) and fj : (d, d) → (dj , dj) are smooth, one-to-one, and
onto, and have strictly positive derivatives. Hence there exists a ϕ :
(
0, dj − dj
)→ (0, di − di)
that is smooth, one-to-one, and onto, has strictly positive derivatives, and satisfies fi (x)−di =
ϕ
(
fj (x)− dj
)
. Thus, also by inequality (18), 0 < ϕ(z) < kzδi/δj for every z ∈ (0, dj − dj).
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Hence, by δj/δi > 1, ϕ(z)/z → 0 and ϕ′(z) → 0 as z → 0. If z and x satisfy z = fi(x) − di,
then z → 0 if and only if x → d. Hence (fi(x)− di) /
(
fj(x)− dj
) → 0 as x → d. Moreover,
since ϕ′(z) = f ′j(x)/f
′
i(x), f
′
j(x)/f
′
i(x)→ 0 as x→ d. ¥
We can now turn to the proof of Proposition 11.
Proof of Proposition 11 To show the first two parts, let i ∈ I and j 6∈ I. Since
lim sup
x→∞
fi(x)/x ≤ 1,
0 ≤ lim inf
x→∞
fj(x)
x
≤ lim sup
x→∞
fj(x)
x
≤ lim sup
x→∞
fj(x)
fi(x)
lim sup
x→∞
fi(x)
x
≤ lim sup
x→∞
fj(x)
fi(x)
.
By Lemma 21, the far right hand side equals zero. Thus fj(x)/x → 0. Since this is true for
every j 6∈ I and ∑Ii=1 fi(x)/x = 1, we must have ∑i∈I fi(x)/x→ 1 as x→∞.
Also, since 0 < f ′i(x) < 1,
0 < f ′j(x) <
f ′j(x)
f ′i(x)
and, for such i and j as in the preceding paragraph, the far right hand side converges to zero
as x → ∞. Hence f ′j(x) → 0 as x → ∞. We must have
∑
i∈I f
′
i(x) → 1 as x → ∞. Since
lim
xj→∞
t′j(xj) < limxi→∞
t′i(xi) ≤ ∞ for every i ∈ I and j 6∈ I, t′j (fj(x)) f ′j(x) → 0 as x → ∞ for
every j 6∈ I. Thus, by Lemma 2 and 0 <∑i∈I f ′i(x) ≤ 1, we have
lim sup
x→∞
t′(x)
= lim sup
x→∞
I∑
i=1
t′i (fi(x)) f
′
i(x)
= lim sup
x→∞
∑
i∈I
t′i (fi(x)) f
′
i(x)
≤ lim sup
x→∞
max
i∈I
t′i (fi(x))
≤ max
i∈{1,...,I}
lim
xi→∞
t′i (xi) .
The other inequality,
max
i∈{1,...,I}
lim
xi→∞
t′i (xi) ≤ lim infx→∞ t
′(x),
can be shown analogously. This proves the first two parts of this proposition.
To prove part 3, let i ∈ I and j 6∈ I. Since 0 < fi(x)− di
x− d < 1 for every x,
0 ≤ lim inf
x→d
fj(x)− dj
x− d ≤ lim supx→d
fj(x)− dj
x− d ≤ lim supx→d
fj(x)− dj
fi(x)− di
lim sup
x→d
fi(x)− di
x− d ≤ lim supx→d
fj(x)− dj
fi(x)− di
.
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By Lemma 22, the far right hand side equals zero. Hence
∑
i∈I (fi(x)− di)
x− d → 1 as x→ d.
Part 4 can be shown in the same manner as for part 2. ¥
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Figure 1: The risk-sharing rules and their first and second derivatives in a four-consumer
economy. Consumers have differing constant coefficients of relative risk aversion βi = 1/γi > 0.
The weights λi in the maximization problem (2) are all set equal to one.
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